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ABSTRACT 
Equity crowdfunding is an increasingly popular means of raising capital for early stage startups. 
It enables entrepreneurs to finance their companies with smaller contributions from a variety of 
people. This paper studies the relationship between the characteristics of a given company and its 
ability to raise funds on an equity crowdfunding platform. A series of statistical and machine 
learning models are fit to data from a U.S.-based equity crowdfunding website, including a 
logistic regression, a CART decision tree, a naïve Bayes classifier, and a support vector machine. 
This study demonstrates that a connection exists between the probability of a company’s 
crowdfunding success and its previous funding history, Twitter presence, media buzz, size, 
location, and its founders’ educational backgrounds. As a whole, however, the classification 
quality of the various models leaves something to be desired. This suggests the need for 
additional data inputs and more longitudinal research in the field of equity crowdfunding. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 New business ventures need financial assistance to grow and succeed. Since the early 
1980s, angel investors and venture capital firms have served as the primary sources of financial 
backing for start-up companies (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). In recent years, however, a new 
pipeline known as “crowdfunding” has emerged to help finance a variety of for-profit, social, 
and cultural projects across the world (Mollick, 2013). Crowdfunding draws inspiration from the 
notions of crowdsourcing (Poetz & Schreier, 2012) and micro-finance (Morduch, 1999), but 
refers to fundraising for new ventures conducted via the Internet. On crowdfunding websites, 
individuals can raise money for their ideas or projects via small contributions from a large 
number of people. Online crowdfunding platforms began to appear as early as 2003 with the 
founding of ArtistShare, a website that allows musicians to seek donations from fans to produce 
new records (Freedman & Nutting, 2015). Since then, the crowdfunding model has taken off. 
Data from the Crowdsourcing Industry Report (2015) indicates that crowdfunding websites 
raised a combined $34 billion in 2015 alone. 
 Equity crowdfunding refers to a particular model of crowdfunding, in which 
entrepreneurs may offer, as compensation for financial contributions, an equity stake in their 
company. Especially for start-ups of limited notoriety, it offers a promising way to raise money 
without the support of a venture capitalist. As of 2015, equity crowdfunding constituted $2.6 
billion of the crowdfunding market globally (Crowdsourcing Industry Report, 2015). Its presence 
in the U.S. has grown substantially since April 2012, when Barack Obama signed into law the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act, 2012). The JOBS Act included Title III, a 
clause known as the CROWDFUND Act that directly addressed equity crowdfunding (Stemler, 
2013). It lifted the ban on general solicitation and general advertising of crowdfunded equity, 
allowing companies to issue equity online more liberally. It also provided for the eventual 
inclusion of “non-accredited” investors1 on U.S. equity crowdfunding platforms, opening the 
potential of equity crowdfunding to the masses. Despite the Security and Exchange 
Commission’s slow ratification of the CROWDFUND Act, much of the language was officially 
approved in October 2015 and should take affect in mid-2016. 
 Given the legislative changes and mounting interest surrounding equity crowdfunding, it 
is important to study the investment dynamics that exist on current equity crowdfunding 
platforms. One would like to understand how entrepreneurs “signal” their qualifications to 
potential investors on the basis of perhaps their educational background, their company’s product 
description and/or video, or the amount they seek to raise. The concept of signaling theory 
stretches back to Spence (1973), who hypothesized that job applicants may pursue a higher 
education to signal their quality and reduce information asymmetry with potential employers. 
Subsequent research has applied signaling theory to a variety of domains, including the 
entrepreneur-investor relationship present in fundraising for early-stage ventures.	
 This study uses data collected from AngelList—a U.S.-based website that connects 
entrepreneurs and potential investors—to investigate those signals. AngelList offers companies 
with profiles on the site the ability to equity crowdfund through its platform. Companies may 
specify the amount of money they are seeking to crowdfund, along with the discount rate of 
issued equity. The data set includes a variety of information about each company, along with a 
binary variable indicating whether or not they received any funding.  
																																																								
1	“Accredited”	investors	occupy	a	special	status	under	financial	regulation	laws.	The	Dodd‐Frank	Wall	Street	
Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act	(2010)	defines	an	accredited	investor	as	including	a	“natural	person	
who	has	individual	net	worth,	or	joint	net	worth	with	the	person’s	spouse,	that	exceeds	$1	million…excluding	
their	primary	residence…[or]…a	natural	person	with	income	exceeding	$200,000	in	each	of	the	two	most	
recent	years	or	joint	income	with	a	spouse	exceeding	$300,000	for	those	years.”	Under	Regulation	D	of	the	
Security	Act	of	1933,	equity	crowdfunding	platforms	were	allowed	to	operate	so	long	as	companies	were	only	
able	to	solicit	funds	in	exchange	for	equity	amongst	a	pool	of	accredited	investors.	The	JOBS	Act	changed	that	
stipulation	so	that	“non‐accredited”	investors	would	be	able	to	invest	in	limited	amounts.	
 A variety of statistical and machine learning models are employed to understand which 
factors about a company best predict the outcome of its equity crowdfunding campaign. The 
models considered—logistic regression, a CART decision tree, a naïve Bayes classifier, and a 
support vector machine—are all suitable to a classification-type problem. An examination of the 
logistic regression coefficients shows that, of the eleven features in the final model, ten are 
statistically significant predictors of funding success. While this doesn’t confirm that these 
predictors are in fact true “signals” that drive investment, it is at least proves that a strong 
relationship exists. Still, this study finds that none of the four models built are particularly adept 
at correctly identifying which companies within the data set actually receive funding. Improving 
classification accuracy is one avenue for further research suggested in the paper’s conclusion. 
 
SURVEY OF EXISTING RESEARCH 
 Given that equity crowdfunding is still in its infancy, the current literature on equity 
crowdfunding is somewhat sparse. The majority of existing research on equity crowdfunding has 
focused on the theoretical implications of the JOBS Act. Argawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2013) 
point to the fact that entrepreneurs may derive a number of benefits from equity crowdfunding. 
First, equity crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to access individuals with the highest 
willingness to pay for equity in their ventures on a truly global scale. Second, it enables 
entrepreneurs to bundle their equity with other rewards that consumers might covet, like early 
product releases. And third, equity crowdfunding can serve as a validation tool to ensure that 
there is substantial demand for the product, providing a particularly informative type of market 
research. Additionally, Macht and Weatherston (2014) hypothesize that equity crowdfunding 
may be attractive to entrepreneurs because it may require them to relinquish less control over 
their companies than a traditional venture capital arrangement. Indeed, most crowdfunders will 
take on very small shareholding positions, limiting their voting rights and their ability to interfere 
with the entrepreneur’s vision. 
 Other scholars have been slow to embrace equity crowdfunding as a viable alternative to 
angel investments. From an entrepreneur’s perspective, scholars note that an equity 
crowdfunding campaign is not without risks. Argawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2013) claim that 
the need to disclose confidential details about an early-stage venture may provide a huge 
deterrent for entrepreneurs. Publicizing a new company before launch may have negative 
repercussions for its intellectual property rights and bargaining power with suppliers. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs who opt for equity crowdfunding instead of venture capital may miss 
out on the industry knowledge, guidance, and connections that a VC typically provides. Finally, 
Valanciene and Jegeleviciute (2013) cite “administrative and accounting challenges” as a major 
hurdle to the adoption of equity crowdfunding by entrepreneurs. Adding a large number of 
shareholders will require careful bookkeeping and raise the possibility that the company becomes 
saddled with investors who have competing personalities and ideas. 
 Perhaps the most widespread criticism for equity crowdfunding has arisen out of 
concerns for potential investors. Individuals who help to fund equity crowdfunding ventures will 
likely be less experienced than the typically venture capitalist or angel investor. They will be less 
accustomed to reading financial documents and inferring the viability of a new start-up. 
Moreover, they will be unable to meet entrepreneurs in person, hindering their ability to conduct 
in-depth due diligence. This may increase the risks associated with investing on equity 
crowdfunding platforms or even make them a target for fraud (Argawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 
2013).  
 Dorff (2013) points out another concern, which stems from the notion of adverse 
selection derived from information asymmetry. The argument goes that truly promising start-ups 
might continue to seek traditional angel investors for their seed funding because angels bring a 
wealth of experience, knowledge, and connections to the table. The start-ups that gravitate 
towards equity crowdfunding platforms, therefore, would be the ones that have lower potential. 
If that were the case, equity crowdfunding would essentially become an example of a “market for 
lemons” (Akerlof, 1970). At the extreme, this could lead to complete market failure. At the very 
least, it calls into question whether investors can expect any positive returns on investment. 
 Though the discussion surrounding equity crowdfunding has provided plenty of 
theoretical debate, few studies have attempted to test these hypotheses with data from equity 
crowdfunding sites. This is likely a product of the fact that such data isn’t widely available yet. 
Because equity crowdfunding is such a new practice, even the largest crowdfunding sites have 
only facilitated deals for several hundred companies each. Thus, data set size in an equity 
crowdfunding study is somewhat constrained for the time being. Researchers are also limited by 
the fact that most equity crowdfunding deals worldwide have taken place within the past several 
years. This means that scholars will likely have to wait a few more years before longitudinal data 
on equity crowdfunded companies becomes a viable source of knowledge. It still remains to be 
seen how crowdfunded companies will fair and whether funders will make a return on their 
investment. 
 Despite the apparent data limitations in equity crowdfunding, at least one empirical paper 
exists analyzing an emerging equity crowdfunding platform. Ahlers et al. (2015) gathered data 
on 104 companies that ran an equity crowdfunding campaign between October 2006 and October 
2011 on the Australian Small Scale Offerings Board (ASSOB). ASSOB is among the largest 
equity crowdfunding sites outside the U.S., with AUD 125 million in funding on the platform as 
of April 2012. It also operates in a country in which non-accredited investors are fully able to 
participate in equity crowdfunding, as will be the case in the U.S. by early 2016. In that sense, 
Ahlers et al. (2015) were able to draw preliminary conclusions about the how equity 
crowdfunding might soon unfold in the U.S. 
   Ahlers et al. (2015) focused their work on a single motivating question: “Given different 
start-ups with similar observable characteristics, what leads small investors to invest in certain 
start-ups and not others?” Their study follows a number of others that analyze signaling theory—
the signals sent by entrepreneurs that lead investors to back early-stage companies (Backes-
Gellner and Werner, 2007; Certo, 2003; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008). It is the first, however, to 
analyze signaling theory in an equity crowdfunding context. Using the dataset derived from 
ASSOB, they find that the exit strategy identified by a company has significant impact on its 
ability to attract investors; traditional forms of external certification—patents, grants, or 
government awards—did not foster more contributions; and that companies with a larger 
percentage of MBA graduates on their executive boards tended to garner more investors. 
 This study represents a notable first step towards more quantitative research in the field 
of equity crowdfunding. However, it begs further research for a number of reasons. Firstly, this 
study was conducted on a limited dataset stemming from a single Australian equity 
crowdfunding platform. Moreover, Ahlers et al.’s (2015) findings contradict several other 
prominent papers from the field of entrepreneurial signaling, including their determination that 
external certification doesn’t influence fundraising ability. This necessarily raises the question of 
whether these inconsistencies are a result of the limits of the ASSOB dataset or a different status 
quo within the realm of equity crowdfunding. 
METHODS 
The Data Set 
 The data set is derived from AngelList, a U.S.-based website intended to connect 
entrepreneurs with potential investors. Companies with AngelList profiles may elect to raise 
funds through AngelList’s equity crowdfunding platform. Prospective investors with 
“accredited” status may log on, survey company details, and choose to invest online. The data set 
includes 5,220 companies that solicited financial contributions through AngelList’s equity 
crowdfunding platform through November 2015. Of the 5,220 companies, 2,603 have complete 
data for the features under consideration. Multiple imputation with chained equations, as detailed 
in White, Royston, Wood (2010), proved unable to effectively fill in these missing values. As a 
result, only those 2,603 companies with full data are used to construct the models that follow.  
 Each company’s data contained 85 features of interest. Most of those features come 
directly from information listed on the start-up’s AngelList profile, including details like its 
location, its product market, its previous mentions in the press, and its number of employees. 
Data about each company’s funding history is collected by cross-referencing the CB Insights 
database for previous funding rounds and their amounts. If a Twitter handle was listed on the 
company’s AngelList page, data about the company’s Twitter activity was gathered using the 
Twitter API. Finally, if a company’s founders provided a link to their Linkedin profiles, 
information on their educational background was also scraped and integrated into the data set. 
 For each company, there is a field indicating how much money, if any, it raised during its 
AngelList crowdfunding campaign. An adaptation of this field serves as the response variable in 
the following models. It is treated as a binary variable, coded as one if the company raised any 
non-zero amount of funding and zero otherwise. This field—which is subsequently referred to as 
“campaign outcome”—is skewed. Of the 2,603 companies included in the data set, only 284 of 
them (10.9%) successfully raised money during their AngelList campaign. The skewedness of 
the outcome variable will function as a major consideration in the evaluation of model fit. 
Empirical Models 
Four different models are considered for predicting campaign outcome: a traditional logistic 
regression, a CART decision tree, a naïve Bayes model, and a support vector machine2. 
Logistic Regression 
 The logistic regression is a generalized linear model suitable for situations where a vector 
of features X is being used to predict a binary outcome. It has wide-ranging use across many 
disciplines of study dating back to its introduction by Cox (1958). It models the log odds of 
response variable y as a linear combination of the predictors in X:  
log ܲሺݕ ൌ 1	|ࢄ; 	ࢼሻܲሺݕ ൌ 0	|ࢄ; 	ࢼሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݔଵ ൅ ⋯൅	ߚௗݔௗ 
The model is fit using maximum-likelihood estimation across the n training instances: 
ࢼ ൌ argmax ݈݋݃	ෑܲሺݕ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
	|	ݔ௜	; 	ࢼሻ 
CART Decision Tree 
 A classification and regression tree (CART) is a machine learning technique used for 
classification purposes. It recursively partitions the data set into m subgroups of instances with 
similar feature vectors. The instances in each group are then classified according to a simple 
prediction model, often just an assignment of the outcome that is more predominant within the 
group. The model is fit so as to minimize the number of classification errors in the training set. 
For more on the CART algorithm, see Breiman et al. (1984). 
																																																								
2 The models are fit in Python using the package scikit-learn. It includes a number of useful algorithms to expedite 
the training and testing of machine learning models. 
Naïve Bayes 
The naïve Bayes classifier is another model from machine learning that is popular in the domain 
of text categorization, but has far-reaching applicability. It infers the conditional probability of 
the response variable y given a particular instance from the data xi by first calculating from the 
data the marginal probability ܲሺݕሻ and the conditional probabilities ܲ൫ ௝ܺ	ห	ݕሻ and then applying 
Bayes’ Rule: 
ܲሺݕ ൌ ݇	|	ܺ ൌ 	ݔ௜ሻ ൌ 	
ܲሺݕ ൌ ݇ሻ∏ ܲ൫ ௝ܺ ൌ ݔ௜௝	ห	ݕ ൌ ݇ሻௗ௝ୀଵ
ܲሺܺ ൌ ݔ௜ሻ  
A new point may be classified according to the equation: 
ݕො ൌ argmaxܲሺݕ ൌ ݇ሻ	∏ ܲሺ ௝ܺ ൌ ݔௗ௝ୀଵ |	ݕ ൌ ݇ሻ  
Support Vector Machine 
Finally, a support vector machine (SVM) is considered. SVMs are among the most commonly 
used machine learning models for classification problems, because they are efficient, work well 
with few training instances, and are guaranteed to find the globally optimum decision boundary 
if it exists (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995). The algorithm attempts to minimize: 
1
݊෍max	ሺ0, 1 െ ݕ௜ሺߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݔଵ ൅ ⋯൅	ߚௗݔௗሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ሻ 
across all training instances n. 
Feature Selection 
 Only a subset of the 85 features will be included in the fitting of various models. Some 
features have little relationship with campaign outcome and others demonstrate significant 
collinearity. To assess which features should be incorporated into the subsequent models, a 
method of feature selection is performed. “Stability selection” is the chosen method, as outlined 
in Meinshausen and Bühlmann (2009). This technique of feature selection works as follows: 
1) Start by creating n subsamples of the complete data set Z with replacement. Each 
sample should be of the same size. This study generates 1000 total subsamples and 
includes 75% of Z in each subsample. 
2) For each subsample of data i: 
a) Fit the baseline model using all eligible features. This study uses the logistic 
regression model as the baseline for feature selection purposes. 
b) Determine the selection set for the subsample i . The selection set is defined: 
              పܵ෡ ൌ ሼ	݇: ߚ௞෢ ് 0	ሽ 
        In other words, the selection set includes the subset of the k features that have  
        significant coefficients in the baseline model. 
3) Compute the probability that a given feature k appears in any of the i fitted models: 
Π௞෢ ൌ ℙ൫൛	݇	߳		 መܵ	ൟ൯ ൌ 	 1݊෍ॴሺ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൛	݇	߳		 పܵ෡ 	ൟ	ሻ 
The probability of selection over all subsamples i is an indication of the feature’s explanatory 
power. Features with higher probabilities have significant coefficients across a larger percentage 
of the fitted models and should therefore be included in the final feature set.   
 The stability selection technique has several attractive properties. It works well on highly 
dimensional data, where the number of features is very large. This isn’t a major concern here, 
given that the crowdfunding data set contains fewer than 100 features, but it is an important 
characteristic of stability selection in other machine learning applications. Second, it provides a 
bounded guarantee on the number of falsely selected variables included in the final feature set 
(Meinshausen and Bühlmann, 2009). And third, it offers a robust way of determining which of a 
number of collinear variables should be kept for modeling purposes. Stability selection assesses 
the significance of the collinear variables’ coefficients with various subsamples of the data and in 
models that include different subsets of other features. Of the collinear variables, the one that 
appears in the most fitted models may be chosen for the final feature set. This is the reason, for 
instance, that “Twitter Presence” is selected over “Previous Tweet Total,” two collinear variables 
(see Table A in Appendix). 
 Using the stability selection method, the 85 features are winnowed down to the eleven 
features that offer the most explanatory power on “campaign outcome.” These eleven features 
are listed in Table B of the Appendix along with a description of each one. Table C shows the 
average value of each of the eleven features for companies that received funding and for those 
that didn’t. These eleven features are used to fit all models.  
Parameter Optimization 
 The parameters for the logistic regression, CART tree, and SVM models are optimized 
using a stochastic search process. They were tuned to maximize the F1-score of each model 
across ten-folds of cross-validation. The F1-score is used because it is easily computed for each 
model and is a direct reflection of the model’s ability to identify successful outcomes efficiently. 
The F1-score3 is defined as: 
ܨଵ ൌ 2 ∗ ݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ∗ ݎ݈݈݁ܿܽ݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ൅ ݎ݈݈݁ܿܽ ൌ 	2 ∗ 	
ܶݎݑ݁	ܲ݋ݏ
2 ∗ ܶݎݑ݁	ܲ݋ݏ ൅ ܨ݈ܽݏ݁	ܲ݋ݏ ൅ ܨ݈ܽݏ݁	ܰ݁݃ 
By using the F1-score, the emphasis is placed on the classification of “positive” examples from 
the data or, in this case, companies that did receive funding. We’d like the models to identify as 
many of the successfully funded companies as possible, while also limiting the number of 
																																																								
3	The	F1‐score	is	used	frequently	in	machine	learning	as	a	gauge	of	the	tradeoff	between	precision	and	recall.	
Precision	is	the	ratio	of	correctly	predicted	positive	cases	to	all	cases	that	are	predicted	positive	by	the	model.	
It	is	often	described	as	the	number	of	predicted	positives	that	are	“relevant.”	Alternatively,	recall	represents	
the	“completeness”	of	the	results,	defined	as	the	ratio	of	correctly	predicted	positives	to	all	true	positives	
from	the	data	set.	Ideally,	both	precision	and	recall	would	be	one,	but	almost	invariably	that	turns	out	
impossible	to	achieve.	
unfunded companies that the models incorrectly classify as funded. This is the trade-off captured 
by the F1-score. 
   The optimal parameters for each model may be viewed in Table D of the Appendix. For 
the support vector machine, a randomized grid search is used to efficiently search continuous 
distributions of possible parameter values, as recommended in Bergstra and Bengio (2012). For 
the logistic regression and CART decision tree, a complete grid search is conducted because the 
possible parameter values are discrete and the parameter search space is sufficiently small. 
 
RESULTS 
 In this section, the models are evaluated by the quality of their fit to the AngelList data 
set. First, the implications of the logistic regression coefficients are reviewed in detail. Then the 
logistic regression’s fit is compared to that of the other three models according to relevant 
criteria like precision, recall, and the F1-score. 
Analyzing the Logistic Regression 
  Table E in the Appendix reports the logistic regression estimation results on the 
AngelList data set. Of the eleven features selected by stability selection, ten of them are 
statistically significant in the logistic regression at the ݌ ൏ 0.05 level. Only “Mentions in 
TechCrunch” fails to meet the ݌ ൏ 0.05 threshold, but just barely (݌ ൌ 0.082). The strongest 
predictors—“Debt”, “Previous Rounds of Funding”, “Twitter Presence”, and “11-50 
Employees”—are highly significant (݌ ൏ 0.001). In other words, choosing to raise debt instead 
of equity funding, having raised a previous round of funding, running a corporate Twitter 
account, and having 11-50 employees at the company (as opposed to 1-10) seem to be associated 
with a higher likelihood of equity crowdfunding success on AngelList, holding all else constant. 
The coefficient of “Founder with MBA” is also positive and statistically significant (݌ ൌ 0.029), 
seeming to echo Ahlers et al. (2015) in suggesting that holding an MBA is associated with more 
positive equity crowdfunding outcomes. For a sample of actual company profiles from the data, 
along with their associated probabilities of success according to the logistic regression, see Table 
F in the Appendix. 
 Ten of the eleven features (excluding the intercept) have positive signs, indicating that 
they share a positive relationship with the outcome variable. Only “S&P Close Previous Day” 
has a statistically significant negative coefficient (-0.0011). This predictor was intended to serve 
as a partial control on the country’s economic health, with the hypothesis being that users on 
AngelList might be more likely to invest during booming periods irrespective of company 
attributes. The fact that “S&P Close Previous Day” has a negative coefficient is a curious 
finding; it implies that, holding all else constant, a lower closing value for S&P 500 on the day 
prior to the start of an equity crowdfunding campaign is related to a higher probability of 
investment. The coefficient must be interpreted with caution, because the value is partially a 
reflection of the other predictors included in the model. However, Table C does demonstrate that 
on average unfunded companies tend to open their campaigns on the day after a higher S&P 500 
close (1718.18) than funded companies (1676.87). Further research must be conducted to 
understand if this finding is an artifact of this particular data set, the AngelList investment 
setting, or a general phenomenon across equity crowdfunding platforms. 
 Still, the implications of the logistic regression are notable. The majority of the features 
selected through stability selection are positive and statistically significant. Further research will 
need to be undertaken to determine whether there is truly a causal relationship between any of 
the features and the outcome variable, as the signaling theory would dictate. But at the very least, 
the coefficients of the logistic regression indicate that there is a connection between a company’s 
location (“San Francisco”), its social media activity (“Twitter Presence”), its buzz in the press 
(“Previous Press Mentions”), and its founders’ educational backgrounds (“Founder That 
Attended Top 20 School” and “Founder with MBA”) and the potential for a successful equity 
crowdfunding effort on AngelList. 
Evaluation of Model Fit 
 Table G shows a variety of metrics that demonstrate the classification quality of each 
model. The values displayed in the table are averages calculated across ten-folds of cross-
validation. The metrics may be defined as follows4: 
ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ ൌ 	 ܶݎݑ݁	ܲ݋ݏ ൅ ܶݎݑ݁	ܰ݁݃ܶݎݑ݁	ܲ݋ݏ ൅ ܶݎݑ݁	ܰ݁݃ ൅ ܨ݈ܽݏ݁	ܲ݋ݏ ൅ ܨ݈ܽݏ݁	ܰ݁݃ 
ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ൌ 	 ்௥௨௘	௉௢௦்௥௨௘	௉௢௦ାி௔௟௦௘	௉௢௦             ܴ݈݈݁ܿܽ ൌ 	
்௥௨௘	௉௢௦
்௥௨௘	௉௢௦ାி௔௟௦௘	ே௘௚ 
ܨଵ ൌ 2 ∗ ݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ∗ ݎ݈݈݁ܿܽ݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ൅ ݎ݈݈݁ܿܽ 
 As may be seen from Table G, no model clearly dominates the others in terms of 
classification performance. The logistic regression does best according to overall accuracy, but 
given the fact that the data is highly skewed, accuracy is misleading. By simply predicting that 
all companies fail in their fundraising efforts, an accuracy of over 88% could be achieved. 
Therefore, the other three metrics—precision, recall, and the F1-score—better demonstrate the 
classification performance in this case.  
 All four models seem to perform admirably according to average precision, average 
recall, and the average F1-score. But upon further investigation, it becomes clear that those 
																																																								
4 In machine learning, a “true positive” denotes an instance in the data set that is predicted to be of the positive class 
by the model (i.e. funded) and actually is. A “false positive” denotes an instance that is predicted to be positive but 
is actually negative. The terms “true negative” and “false negative” are defined similarly. 
numbers are inflated by the fact that the models are much better at correctly identifying the more 
preponderant unfunded companies. When it comes to classifying companies that actually 
received funding, the models are markedly worse. The logistic regression again performs best in 
terms of average precision across the ten-folds of cross-validation (0.41). Still, this demonstrates 
that, of the companies that the logistic regression predicts as funded, only 41% of them actually 
are. Moreover, the logistic regression’s recall score is the worst among the four models, 
illustrating the tradeoff between precision and recall. The naïve Bayes classifier seems to best at 
balancing this tradeoff with similar precision (0.33) and recall (0.34) scores and the highest F1-
score of the four models considered (0.33).  
 As a secondary indication of classification performance, I present the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic Curve (ROC Curve) for all four models in Figure 1. The ROC Curve plots the rate 
of true positives to the rate of false positives for a given model. In other words, as you prod the 
model to predict more and more positives, how many true positive predictions do you gain for all 
the false positives you create? A perfect model would hit a true positive rate of 100% 
immediately and never waver, meaning the curve would jump from the origin to the upper left 
hand corner. A random model would follow the dotted line shown in Figure 1 on which the true 
positive rate and false positive rate increase in proportion. All four of the fitted models clearly 
outperform a random one, with the logistic regression and naïve Bayes doing best according to 
ROC. Still, they are nowhere nearly the ideal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This study is among the first quantitative analyses conducted using data from an equity 
crowdfunding platform. A series of models are built to understand the way in which various 
company characteristics are related to probable campaign outcomes. It contributes to the 
emergent literature on crowdfunding by demonstrating that there exists a relationship between a 
company’s likelihood of crowdfunding success and its previous funding history, Twitter 
presence, media buzz, size, location, and its founders’ educational backgrounds. These 
associations are made clear by the slate of positive, statistically significant coefficient values that 
appear in a logistic regression fitted to the data set. 
 This paper also contributes by showing that there remains much to learn about the 
investment dynamics that currently exist on an equity crowdfunding platform. Despite best 
efforts to select relevant features and tune model parameters, none of our four models were 
overly impressive in their ability to correctly classify companies according to whether or not 
their campaign would be successful. Precision and recall scores were markedly low, especially 
for the subset of companies that ultimately did receive funding on AngelList. More complex 
classification algorithms—artificial neural networks, Restricted Bolzmann machines, for 
instance—could be tried on the data set, but marginal improvements would likely result.  
 In reality, no model, no matter how sophisticated, can wholly supplant the need for better, 
more representative data. Indeed, this study was forced to remove about half of the training 
instances because of missing data for the educational fields (“Founder with MBA” and “Founder 
that Attended Top 20 School”). Moreover, there are almost certainly other factors that would 
demonstrate a significant relationship with the outcome variable that are unaccounted for here. 
None of the features included in the final feature set explicitly captures the company’s product 
market, its video’s content and quality, or the strength of its founders’ professional networks 
(although perhaps “Previous Funding Round” may serve as a proxy). More effort should be 
made to collect data on companies that choose equity crowdfunding for raising capital. 
 More academic work in equity crowdfunding must also be done to understand the 
direction of causality (if any) that exists between company attributes and campaign success. The 
significant coefficients in the logistic regression simply demonstrate that a host of relationships 
exist; it does nothing to show that having a company Twitter or a founding team with a more 
impressive educational profile actually causes users on AngelList to invest. This requires a much 
more stringent set of conditions. Perhaps the most feasible way to infer causality would be 
through a controlled experiment in which subjects are offered a series of investment options on a 
fictitious, equity crowdfunding platform. Underlying characteristics in each company profile 
could be incrementally tweaked in an attempt to parse out drivers of investment. 
 Still another line of future research arises naturally from the changes taking place in 
equity crowdfunding as a result of the JOBS Act. The data incorporated into this study was 
collected in November 2015, meaning that it reflects investment decisions made only by a pool 
of “accredited” investors. As a result of the JOBS Act, soon AngelList and other equity 
crowdfunding platforms will be able to provide investment opportunities for “non-accredited” 
investors as well. This change has the potential to drastically alter the composition of investor 
pools on many equity crowdfunding platforms. Moreover, the preferences of non-accredited 
investors may impact the probability that a given company will receive funding. Subsequent 
studies must test whether the insights derived in this paper still hold on a platform where 
accredited and non-accredited investors are allowed to intermingle. 
 And, as a final avenue of future research, the longitudinal effects of using an equity 
crowdfunding platform need to be measured. It would be informative for both entrepreneurs and 
investors alike to understand how choosing an equity crowdfunding campaign over VC funding 
affects a company’s growth rate, the likelihood of subsequent funding, or its ability to attract 
high quality talent. Given how recently most of the companies in the AngelList data set launched 
their equity crowdfunding campaigns, such a comparison was not yet possible. After more time 
elapses and equity crowdfunding becomes more established in the U.S. among non-accredited 
investors, it is believed that such comparisons will shed much needed light on the equity 
crowdfunding model’s ability to produce profitable companies. Only through this line of 
research will Dorff’s (2013) hypothesis that equity crowdfunding represents a “market for 
lemons” be tested. Such considerations are left to future research. 
  
 APPENDIX 
Feature Selection Rate* 
Previous Round of Funding 56.4% 
San Francisco 51.0% 
Previous Funding Round Count 50.6% 
Twitter Presence 49.4% 
Previous Press Mentions 48.2% 
11-50 Employees 48.0% 
Founder that Attended Top 20 School 45.0% 
Mentions in TechCrunch 40.4% 
Debt 30.0% 
Days on Twitter 28.3% 
Number of Founders Listed 27.8% 
Percentage that Attended Top 20 School 24.4% 
Founder with MBA 15.5% 
Previous Funding Total 12.1% 
Previous Tweet Total 10.5% 
S&P Close Previous Day 8.4% 
Percentage with MD 4.9% 
Percentage with MBA 1.2% 
Mentions in VentureBeat 0.5% 
Mentions in Forbes 0.5% 
Software as a Service Company 0.2% 
All other features 0.0% 
              Table A: Results from stability selection on the AngelList data set  
  *Selection Rate = percentage of randomized models in which the feature 
  was selected by the stability selection algorithm 
  The threshold for inclusion in the final feature set was a 5.0% selection rate. 
  If variables were collinear (i.e. Twitter Presence and Previous Tweet Total) 
  only one of them was included in the final feature set. 
  
 Feature Description Source 
Previous Round of Funding A binary variable indicating whether or not the 
company has previously received funding 
CB Insights  
Twitter Presence A binary variable indicating whether or not the 
company has a Twitter profile 
Twitter API 
Previous Press Mentions A count variable indicating the number of times 
the company has been mentioned in any press 
publication 
AngelList 
Mentions in TechCrunch A count variable indicating the number of times 
the company has been mentioned in TechCrunch 
AngelList 
Number of Founders Listed A count variable indicating the number of people 
listed as a co-founder on the company’s 
AngelList profile 
AngelList 
11-50 Employees A binary variable indicating whether or not the 
company’s AngelList profile lists 11-50 
employees as the company’s size 
AngelList 
San Francisco A binary variable indicating whether or not the 
company is based in San Francisco 
AngelList 
Founder with MBA A binary variable indicating whether, among the 
founders listed on AngelList, there is at least one 
founder who holds an MBA 
LinkedIn 
Founder that Attended Top 20 
School 
A binary variable indicating whether, among the 
founders listed on AngelList, there is at least one 
founder who attended a Top 20 U.S. university 
for any level of schooling 
LinkedIn 
S&P 500 Close Previous Day The closing number for the S&P 500 on the day 
prior to the launch of the company’s AngelList 
crowdfunding campaign 
Yahoo! 
Finance 
Table B: A look at all the significant features identified through stability selection. 
  
Feature Campaign Outcome = 0 Campaign Outcome = 1
Previous Round of Funding 0.03 0.14 
Twitter Presence 0.36 0.57 
Previous Press Mentions 0.95 2.84 
Mentions in TechCrunch 0.01 0.08 
Number of Founders Listed 1.70 2.00 
11-50 Employees 0.05 0.15 
San Francisco 0.04 0.13 
Debt 0.12 0.31 
Founder with MBA 0.12 0.21 
Founder that Attended Top 20 School 0.10 0.22 
S&P 500 Close Previous Day 1718.18 1676.87 
  Table C: Averages of the 10 features for both classes of the response variable. 
 
 
Model Parameter Search Method Optimal Parameters 
Logistic Regression Exhaustive Grid Search Class Weights5: {0 : 0.15, 1: 0.85}  
   
CART Decision Tree Exhaustive Grid Search Class Weights: {0: 0.2, 1: 0.8} 
# of features to consider when 
looking for best split: sqrt(max) 
Maximum depth of tree: 3 
Split Criterion: entropy 
   
Support Vector Machine Randomized Grid Search Class Weights: {0: 0.2, 1: 0.8} 
C: 175 
Gamma: 0.0026 
  Table D: Optimal parameter values of all models considered according to grid search. 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
5	The	“class	weights”	parameter	denotes	the	amount	of	weight	placed	upon	a	misclassification	of	each	class	
during	the	training	phase.	In	other	words,	if	class	weight	=	{0:	0.,	1:	0.9},	a	misclassification	of	a	successfully	
funded	company	is	four	times	as	costly	as	a	misclassification	of	an	unfunded	company.	Altering	the	class	
weights	is	intended	to	steer	the	classifier	towards	making	more	positive	predictions	and	to	counteract	the	
skewedness	of	the	response	variable.	
Feature Coefficient Std Error z P>|z| 95% Conf. Int. 
Intercept -1.3130 0.596 -2.202 0.028 -2.482 -0.144
Previous Round of Funding 1.1088 0.241 4.594 0.000 0.636 1.582
Twitter Presence 0.5191 0.138 3.768 0.000 0.249 0.789
Previous Press Mentions 0.0359 0.013 2.805 0.005 0.011 0.061
Mentions in TechCrunch 0.5215 0.300 1.740 0.082 -0.066 1.109
Number of Founders Listed 0.1289 0.065 1.980 0.048 0.001 0.256
11-50 Employees 0.7994 0.212 3.762 0.000 0.383 1.216
San Francisco 0.6992 0.224 3.123 0.002 0.260 1.138
Debt 0.8779 0.155 5.662 0.000 0.574 1.182
Founder with MBA 0.3847 0.176 2.180 0.029 0.039 0.731
Founder that Attended Top 20 School 0.5165 0.179 2.889 0.004 0.166 0.867
S&P Close Previous Day -0.0011 0.000 -3.259 0.001 -0.002 -0.000
  
Log-Likelihood = -790.59 Pseudo-R2 = 0.1187  
Table E: The logistic regression model. All features are significant at p = 0.05 aside from 
Mentions in TechCrunch. 
 
 
Feature Nimble* Mednyma* Zodio** 
Previous Round of Funding 1 0 0 
Twitter Presence 1 0 0 
Previous Press Mentions 11 0 0 
Mentions in TechCrunch 2 0 0 
Number of Founders Listed 1 1 1 
11-50 Employees 1 0 1 
San Francisco 0 0 0 
Debt 1 0 0 
Founder with MBA 0 0 1 
Founder that Attended Top 20 School 0 0 0 
S&P 500 Close Previous Day 1472.05 1319.68 1265.33 
    
ܲሺ݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁ ൌ 1	|	ࢄሻ 0.874 0.112 0.249 
Actual	Outcome	 Successful Unsuccessful Successful 
 Table F: Three example company profiles along with the logistic regression predicted 
 outcome given their attributes.       *Correct Prediction **Incorrect Prediction 
 
Model  Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
Logistic Regression Campaign Outcome = 0 .90 .96 .93
 Campaign Outcome = 1 .41 .19 .26
 Average  .87 .85 .88 .86
    
CART Decision Tree Campaign Outcome = 0 .92 .75 .82
 Campaign Outcome = 1 .15 .40 .22
 Average .85 .84 .71 .76
    
Naïve Bayes model Campaign Outcome = 0 .92 .91 .91
 Campaign Outcome = 1 .33 .34 .33
 Average .83 .85 .85 .85
    
Support Vector Machine Campaign Outcome = 0 .91 .92 .92
 Campaign Outcome = 1 .27 .23 .24
 Average .86 .84 .85 .84
Table G: A look at the precision, recall, and F1-scores for each model. The model  parameters 
were tuned to maximize the F1-score when the true value of campaign outcome is one. Values 
reflect the average across 10-fold cross-validation on the holdout set. 
 
Figure 1: The ROC Curve for each model 
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